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VOLUNTARY ACTION TO HELP CURB INFLATION
Since the start of the Korean war, several
new measures have been introduced and
existing measures used more intensively for
the purpose of curbing inflationary pressures
which result in part from excessive credit ex-
pansion. One of the new measures, the Vol-
untary Credit Restraint Program, provides
on a nationwide basis a means whereby all
major groups of lending institutions can par-
ticipate in an over-all effort to help check in-
flation. The cooperative efforts of partici-
pants in this Program to curtail the use of
credit for speculative purposes and to divert
funds from nonessential to essential uses
have been very helpful in limiting over-all
credit expansion while at the same time as-
suring adequate funds for the defense effort.
The Voluntary Credit Restraint Program
was established as a supplement to, rather
than as a substitute for, general credit re-
straint measures. It is very difficult to ap-
praise the over-all credit needs of the econ-
omy or to say whether the granting of a
particular loan may have undesirable infla-
tionary repercussions. By screening requests
for short- and long-term financing on the
basis of broad criteria for essential and non-
essential uses, however, lending institutions
can help to restrain over-all credit expansion
and assure that available funds are employed
for essential purposes.
The effectiveness of any measure of pub-
lic policy depends to a great extent on a full
understanding of its limitations as well as
its capabilities. To expect the Voluntary
Credit Restraint Program to do more than
it is capable of doing would be as damaging
to its success as would its own failure to em-
ploy fully the means at its disposal. Since
the Program is dependent on the support
which it gets from lending officers, public
officials, businessmen, and the general pub-
lic, a brief statement of its objectives and
methods of operation may be useful.
NEED FOR CREDIT RESTRAINT
It became apparent soon after the out-
break of war in Korea that comprehensive
measures would have to be adopted for the
purpose of restraining inflation. Speculative
and scare buying by individuals and busi-
nesses in anticipation of defense needs and
possible wartime shortages brought about a
rapid advance in prices during the summer
of 1950. Much of this buying was financed,
from either choice or necessity, with bor-
rowed funds, and the resulting expansion
of the money supply helped to sustain and
multiply inflationary pressures.
The Defense Production Act of 1950,
which became effective September 8, au-
thorized the establishment of selective regu-
lations to restrain consumer instalment credit
and some forms of real estate mortgage
credit. While consumer instalment credit
regulation had an almost immediate effect in
that area, the impact of the real estate mort-
gage credit regulation was considerably de-
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layed, largely because of loan commitments
made prior to the effective date of regulation.
The Act did not, however, authorize, ex-
cept on a voluntary basis, the regulation of
such other important credit areas as business
and State and local government borrowing
or conventional mortgage lending on exist-
ing properties. During the last half of 1950,
credit in these areas continued to expand in
response to demand. Business borrowing
from commercial banks rose 5 billion dol-
lars, as shown in the table, while both State
and local government and corporate new
long-term financing remained at fairly high
levels.
INCREASES IN SELECTED TYPES OF CREDIT, 1950-51































































Source.—Federal Reserve Board, Home Loan Bank Board,
Department of Commerce, Securities and Exchange Commission,
and Bond Buyer.
NOTE.—Data on consumer and real estate mortgage credit and
commercial bank business loans represent net changes in outstand-
ing amounts; those on corporate new capital and State and local
government security issues are gross amounts of new issues with
no account taken of retirements or redemptions.
It was expected that materials allocations
and shortages, building restrictions, and se-
lective restraint of real estate mortgage
credit would in time necessitate some over-
all curtailment of investment expenditures,
including business inventory accumulation
and plant and equipment expenditures, State
and local government capital expenditures,
and residential construction. Nevertheless,
the outlook for 1951 was for a substantial
volume of investment, some essential to the
defense effort but some nonessential and de-
ferrable. A total volume of investment as
large as that anticipated for 1951 was bound
to intensify inflationary pressures, especially
if financed through borrowing which re-
sulted in additions to the money supply, and
even to some extent if financed from past or
current savings. The problem, therefore,
was one of diverting labor and materials
from nonessential uses to defense produc-
tion and the expansion of basic industrial
capacity, employing whatever measures were
available and could be used effectively to
accomplish this diversion.
Since a substantial part of the investment
contemplated by individuals, businesses, and
State and local governments would be fi-
nanced with funds obtained from banks,
insurance companies, and other financing
institutions, the restriction of such financ-
ing could aid in the diversion of labor and
materials to essential projects. The Defense
Production Act of 1950, in Section 708, au-
thorized financing institutions to enter into
voluntary agreements and programs to re-
strain credit in such manner as would further
the objectives of the Act. Voluntary re-
straint of this type would require the active
cooperation of suppliers of short-term work-
ing capital as well as long-term investment
funds.
Institutional investors, including life and
property insurance companies, commercial
and mutual savings banks, and savings and
loan associations, are at present the principal
sources of long-term investment funds, while
commercial banks have long been major
sources of short-term business credit. Dur-
ing the postwar period 1946-50, additions to
the investment portfolios of these institu-
tions accounted for 88 per cent of the in-
crease in real estate mortgage debt, and for
77 per cent of the increase in long-term cor-
porate and State and local government debt.
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NOTE.—Figures on total outstanding debt: Department of
Commerce estimates. Figures on institutional holdings: life in-
surance companies—Institute of Life Insurance; property in-
surance companies—The Spectator Insurance Year Book; mu-
tual savings banks—National Association of Mutual Savings
Banks; commercial banks—Federal Reserve System; savings
and loan associations—Home Loan Bank Board.
Total long-term corporate debt, denned as debt having an
original maturity of one year or more from date of issue, ex-
eludes intercorporate borrowing. Federal and State and local
government debt includes both short- and long-term but excludes
portion held by agencies and trust and sinking funds.
At the end of 1950, as shown in the chart,
they held three-fourths of all real estate
mortgage debt, over half of all State and
local and long-term corporate debt, and over
two-fifths of Federal debt outstanding.
If the investment and lending activities of
these financing organizations could be di-
rected, through a program of voluntary
credit restraint, toward the restriction of
speculative uses of credit and the diversion of
funds from nonessential to essential pur-
poses, there was a real possibility that such
action would help to check inflationary pres-
sures and facilitate the diversion of labor
and materials to essential uses.
In accordance with the provisions of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 and related
executive order, and upon invitation of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, representatives of commercial banks,
life insurance companies, and investment
bankers undertook to set up such a program.
Following a series of conferences that began
in the fall of 1950 there emerged, on March 9,
1951, a program of voluntary credit restraint.
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With the approval of the Attorney General,
a letter was sent by the Board to all private
financing institutions in the United States,
requesting their cooperation in accomplish-
ing the objectives of the Program.
Adequate safeguards were established by
the Defense Production Act to assure that
there would be no infringement of anti-
trust statutes. A representative of the Fed-
eral Reserve System is present to represent
the public interest in practically all regional
or national meetings of those taking part in
the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program.
Moreover, the Program by its very nature
excludes one of the primary incentives to
collusive action by calling for the limitation
of lending activity and hence of lenders'
profits.
In contrast to general measures which in-
fluence the over-all supply of credit, and se-
lective restraints which influence the demand
for specific types of credit through regula-
tion of loan terms and conditions, the Vol-
untary Credit Restraint Program seeks to
direct the flow of credit away from non-
essential and speculative uses by the volun-
tary action of lenders in approving or dis-
approving applications for funds. To do
this it has been necessary to have certain
criteria that would be of aid in assessing
objectively the merits of individual loan
applications and proposed bond and stock
offerings in relation to over-all economic
conditions and requirements.
Responsibility for formulating and apply-
ing such lending criteria rests with the in-
stitutions participating in the Program. For
their guidance the Board of Governors has
drawn leaders from the private lending field
together in a National Voluntary Credit Re-
straint Committee. The functions of the
National Committee include the formula-
tion of appropriate general lending stand-
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ards that may be applied throughout the
country and the coordination of the work
of numerous regional committees. The re-
gional committees, whose members are ap-
pointed by the National Committee, assist
the thousands of participating financing in-
stitutions in applying these standards. While
neither the National Committee nor the
regional committees have any authority to
direct the policies of the cooperating financ-
ing institutions, they can and do exert con-
siderable influence on the thinking and de-
cisions of lending officers and upon prospec-
tive borrowers who know of the Program
and are in sympathy with its principles and
objectives.
The original conference group, in prepar-
ing the Statement of Principles, and the Na-
tional Committee, in drafting the Bulletins
which explain the application of these princi-
ples to specific credit areas, were fully aware
of the difficulties that would be involved in
formulating and applying comprehensive
and precise rules and regulations to accom-
plish the purposes of the Program. Moreover,
it was felt that detailed rules and regulations
would not be compatible with the voluntary
character of the Program, and might well
discourage many institutions from even at-
tempting to participate.
It was deemed better to phrase the stand-
ards in fairly broad terms, to try to ex-
press a point of view rather than a host of
detailed and specific criteria for lending
practices, and to rely upon the willingness of
lending institutions to conform to the spirit
of the Program. Hence, lending standards
set forth initially in the Program's Statement
of Principles were very general in character,
attempting primarily to distinguish between
financing which contributed to the produc-
tion and distribution of essential goods and
services and financing which served merely
to effect a transfer of ownership of existing
securities or physical assets or to permit
speculative purchases of securities and com-
modities.
AREAS OF RESTRAINT
As the Program developed, more specific
lending standards were formulated to guide
restraint in particular credit areas. In gen-
eral, the areas selected by the Committee
have been those in which actual or antici-
pated expansion of credit was substantial,
statutory selective credit restraints were not
applicable, and for which the financial insti-
tutions participating in the Program were a
major source of credit. Between March and
September 1951, the National Committee
issued six Bulletins, setting forth general
principles to guide participants in meeting
demands for inventory loans, business capi-
tal expenditure financing, State and local
government borrowing, certain types of real
estate credit, borrowing by foreigners, and
borrowing on unlisted securities. Of these,
the first four are of most widespread interest,
and are discussed in some detail in the fol-
lowing sections.
INVENTORY LOANS
In the months following the outbreak of
war in Korea, business inventories expanded
sharply. Between June and December 1950,
total book value of manufacturing and trade
inventories rose nearly 8 billion dollars.
Much of the increase was in raw materials,
and a good part of it was financed with bank
credit. For example, purchased materials in
the hands of manufacturers increased nearly
3.5 billion dollars, or 30 per cent, in the last
six months of 1950, and manufacturers'
inventories of goods in process and whole-
salers' inventories each rose about 18 per
cent.
During this same period, as shown in the
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chart, business loans of commercial banks
increased about 5 billion dollars. A major
part of this increase appears to have repre-
sented loans for purchasing or carrying in-
ventories. A special survey of business loans
made by the larger weekly reporting mem-
ber banks between June 28 and November 1
revealed that 60 per cent of the net funds
advanced was estimated to be inventory
loans, of which more than 80 per cent was
advanced to dealers and processors of agri-
cultural commodities.
COMMODITY PRICES,
BUSINESS INVENTORIES, AND BANK LOANS








NOTE.—Prices, Bureau of Labor Statistics index for 28 basic
commodities, last week in month. Business loans include com-
mercial and industrial loans of all insured commercial banks at
end of month; June and December figures from call reports
of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, other months esti-
mated by Federal Reserve from weekly reporting member bank
data. Inventories, U. S. Department of Commerce data on
total manufacturing and trade inventories at end of month;
book value, unadjusted for seasonal variation.
While these groups customarily borrow
rather heavily from banks in the last half
of the year, such borrowing and the inven-
tory accumulation that it permitted were sub-
stantially larger in 1950 than was required
for the orderly movement of agricultural
crops. That speculation was an important
element in this period is indicated by the
sharp price increases which occurred. The
average of 28 basic commodity prices ad-
vanced 50 per cent between end-of-June 1950
and mid-January 1951. Inventories continued
to rise sharply through the early months of
1951 and were at extraordinarily high levels
in mid-March when the National Commit-
tee held its initial meeting and selected this
area as the subject of its first Bulletin.
The Committee pointed out that excessive
inventory accumulation had contributed di-
rectly to a rise in wholesale and retail prices
to levels beyond those justified by the supply
situation and that an important part of the
abnormal inventory increase was being fi-
nanced with borrowed money. The Com-
mittee expressed the hope that all participat-
ing financing institutions would refrain from
financing inventory increases above normal
levels relative to sales, or reasonable require-
ments as determined by other available yard-
sticks, and also that all participants would
encourage borrowers who already had excess
inventories to bring them in line as promptly
as possible in order to reduce the amount of
credit outstanding.
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT FINANCING
Prospects of good business for some time
to come and of materials and equipment
shortages that would result from increased
defense production, as well as the necessity
of expanding productive capacity for such
vital materials as steel, aluminum, and pe-
troleum, encouraged businessmen to revise
their capital expenditure plans sharply up-
ward in the months following the outbreak
of war in Korea.
Early in 1951, according to surveys made
by the Department of Commerce and Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, businesses
as a group were planning to spend nearly 24
billion dollars during the current year for
the enlargement and modernization of their
facilities. These earlier expectations, which
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now appear to have understated the actual
1951 volume of plant and equipment out-
lays, called for a total expenditure one-fourth
larger than the previous peak expenditure of
19.2 billion in 1948. Such major defense or
defense-supporting industries as steel, alumi-
num, petroleum, electric power, and rail-
roads accounted for roughly half of the
anticipated capital expenditures. Of the re-
maining half, an important part represented
expansion that appeared to be postponable
without detriment to the defense effort.
Though many of these business expansion
programs would be financed, as in previous
postwar years, out of retained earnings, a
number would necessitate external financ-
ing through bank or insurance company
loans or the sale of securities. In 1948, for
example, with business expenditures on new
plant and equipment totaling 19.2 billion
dollars, corporate new capital issues to fi-
nance plant and equipment amounted to
4.2 billion; similarly, in 1950, with expendi-
tures of 18.6 billion, new capital issues for
this purpose totaled 3.0 billion. While not
much more than one-fourth of capital ex-
penditures might be financed in this man-
ner, a projected increase in capital expendi-
tures of 25 per cent for 1951 could be ex-
pected to result in a substantial increase in
the volume of security issues. Though many
of these expenditures were in defense or de-
fense-connected industries, it was recognized
that this was an area in which voluntary ac-
tion could prove useful in obtaining the
postponement of nonessential projects and
the diversion of the credit they would have
required to more essential purposes.
While the Committee feels that capital
expenditure programs should be held to a
minimum during the present emergency, in
the interest of reducing inflationary pres-
sures and facilitating the use of labor and
materials where most essential to the defense
effort, its recommendations in this area have
of necessity been somewhat circumscribed.
For one thing, the Statement of Principles
excluded from review loans guaranteed or
insured, or authorized as to purpose by a
Government agency. For another, the Com-
mittee has not been in a position to dis-
courage directly outlays to be financed out
of accumulated business savings or through
previously arranged commitments. Thus, its
recommendations have related to new financ-
ing for clearly nonessential investment pur-
poses.
To the extent that nonessential capital ex-
penditure programs were to be financed with
the proceeds of security flotations, the par-
ticipating institutions were in a strategic po-
sition to exert a restraining influence. In re-
cent years, more than half of the dollar
amount of new capital issues has been placed
directly with financial institutions, especially
life insurance companies, and most publicly
offered securities are sold through investment
bankers.
On April 20, the Committee issued Bulle-
tin No. 2 citing long-term financing which
might be postponed to a more propitious
time. This included loans and security is-
sues for such purposes as: (1) construction
of facilities to improve the competitive posi-
tion of an individual producer of nonessen-
tial goods; (2) expansion and modernization
expenditures of concerns in distribution or
service lines where the distribution or serv-
ice is not defense supporting; and (3) ex-
pansion and modernization programs for
the manufacture of consumer goods not re-
lated to the defense effort.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING
Credit expansion by State and local gov-
ernments has been substantial during the
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postwar period. As discussed on pages 1356-
60 of this BULLETIN, relatively large amounts
of long-term credit have been obtained by
States and localities to finance their postwar
construction programs. Many of these pro-
grams are still far from completion. More-
over, the tax-exempt status of State and local
government securities, which makes them
very attractive to certain investors in a pe-
riod of high progressive income taxes, fa-
cilitates the financing of continued large ex-
penditures. In order to curb the potential
inflationary pressures inherent in a situation
of this type, the National Committee has
recommended the deferment of public works
not urgently needed for preservation of pub-
lic health and safety or for purposes directly
related to defense.
On May 3, 1951, in Bulletin No. 3, the
Committee recommended postponement of
such capital outlays as those for recreational
facilities, war memorials, and the acquisi-
tion of privately owned utilities and of sites
and rights-of-way not immediately needed.
The Committee also expressed the view that
soldiers' bonus issues were inflationary under
the conditions then prevailing and should
be postponed until such time as immediate
purchasing power might be needed to coun-
teract unemployment and when it might be
more beneficial to the veteran. In addition,
institutional lenders were urged to encourage
local governments to balance their operating
budgets and to hold to a minimum short-
term borrowing in anticipation of revenues.
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE CREDIT
The role of voluntary action in supple-
menting and reinforcing selective credit re-
straint measures is particularly well illus-
trated by developments in the real estate
mortgage credit area. In an effort to curb
the rapid expansion of real estate mortgage
credit, the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, exercising the authority
granted it by the Defense Production Act of
1950 and related executive order, issued with
the concurrence of the Administrator of the
Housing and Home Finance Agency its
Regulation X, effective October 12, 1950.
Simultaneously the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration and Veterans Administration
adapted their regulations to the new stand-
ards developed by the Board.
The establishment of these regulations,
which applied to Government-guaranteed
mortgages on new and existing houses, to
non-Government-guaranteed, or convention-
al, mortgage loans on newly constructed
houses, and to loans on certain classes of
commercial property, brought about a sharp
decline in the number of new houses started
in 1951. On the other hand, failure to in-
clude credit extended on conventional terms
for the purchase of existing houses enhanced
the competitive advantage of such properties
in the real estate market, and in many cases
their transfers were accompanied by an ex-
pansion of real estate mortgage debt which
added to inflationary pressures.
The National Voluntary Credit Restraint
Committee, in Bulletin No. 4, issued on June
6 and revised in some respects on Septem-
ber 5, recommended that new conventional
mortgage loans on existing one- to four-
family residential units, together with other
indebtedness outstanding on the property,
should not exceed the limit which Regula-
tion X imposes on new construction or a
limit of two-thirds of the fair value of the
property, whichever is greater. The Com-
mittee also recommended that loans on
larger residential properties and on commer-
cial, agricultural, and industrial property
should in most cases not exceed two-thirds
of the fair value and should be made only if
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careful screening as to purpose indicates that
they are in harmony with the Voluntary
Credit Restraint Program.
EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM
The Voluntary Credit Restraint Program
has been one of the factors contributing to
the abatement of inflationary pressures dur-
ing the late spring and summer of 1951.
Its contribution, however, must be evaluated
in the light of other factors.
For one thing, inflationary pressures have
been lessened and credit demands have been
reduced by a decline in demand for certain
types of consumer durable goods, liquidation
of some types of inventories, and a marked
increase in individuals' current saving. For
another, the Program is only one of a number
of measures for curtailing the use of credit
for speculative purposes and for diverting
available funds from nonessential to essen-
tial uses.
Since the primary function of the Volun-
tary Credit Restraint Program is one of di-
recting the flow of available credit rather
than of regulating the over-all volume of
credit expansion, its effectiveness as an anti-
inflationary measure was greatly enhanced
by the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord
reached in March 1951. Following the ac-
cord, the Federal Reserve System abandoned
its policy of purchasing United States Gov-
ernment securities at largely predetermined
and inflexible prices—a policy that had en-
abled holders to dispose of Government
securities at will, generally without incurring
losses, whenever more attractive loan or in-
vestment opportunities presented themselves.
This policy had resulted in substantial addi-
tions to bank reserves.
The existence of a freer and more flexible
market for Government securities has caused
many financing institutions to restrict their
lending activities and forward financing
commitments and this has helped to check
over-all credit expansion. Thus, with the
CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND AGRICULTURAL
LOANS, BY INDUSTRY, MIDYEAR THROUGH OCTOBER
{In millions of dollars]
Business of borrower
Manufacturing and mining:
Food, liquor, and tobacco
Textiles, apparel, and leather
Metals and metal products
Petroleum, coal, chemicals, and rubber. .




Public utilities and transportation
Construction
All other types of business
Loans classified as to business






























NOTE.—Data for 1951 were collected at the request of the
National Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee from about 220
weekly reporting member banks. Data for 1950 are from a special
survey of selected member banks in leading cities. Although the
coverage is less complete for 1950 than for 1951, all of the large
banks that cooperated in the 1950 survey are included in the 1951
data.
Federal Reserve System acting to restrict the
growth of total credit, it has been possible
for the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program
to function with greater effectiveness.
That the Voluntary Credit Restraint Pro-
gram, together with other selective and gen-
eral credit restraint measures, has achieved
considerable success in diverting credit from
speculative and nonessential activities to es-
sential uses is suggested by the postponement
of a number of proposed security offerings
and by the shift in lending at member banks
from nondefense to defense and defense-
supporting industries. As shown in the
table, the amount of new loans granted to
manufacturers of metals and metal products
and to public utility and transportation con-
cerns was substantially greater from midyear
through October 1951 than in the corre-
sponding period of 1950. On the other hand,
the amounts granted to wholesale and retail
trade concerns, commodity dealers, and sales
finance companies were substantially less this
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year than last, as was the total of all commer-
cial, industrial and agricultural loans.
No over-all figures on the number of loan
applications denied or postponed by financ-
ing institutions in accordance with the prin-
ciples of the Program are available. While,
as noted in the statement on pages 1362-65
of this BULLETIN, a substantial number of
cases have been referred to one or another
of the regional committees for recommenda-
tions, financing institutions have themselves
in the majority of cases taken the initiative
in approving or denying financing requests
on the basis of recommendations contained
in the national Bulletins. In cases where
proposed security offerings or loan applica-
tions have been referred to regional commit-
tees, and where such regional committees
have recommended against the proposed
security issue or loan, the financing insti-
tutions involved have almost without ex-
ception strongly supported committee recom-
mendations.
One of the initial deterrents to the Pro-
gram's success, the existence of legally bind-
ing commitments to provide funds that
had been made before the Program came into
existence, has in recent months become less
important. Data collected in connection
with the Program show, for example, that
45 life insurance companies, whose com-
bined assets represent 85 per cent of all life
insurance company assets, had 4.5 billion dol-
lars of commitments outstanding at the end
of April 1951. Of this amount roughly 1.7
billion represented proposed financing of de-
fense and defense-supporting activities and
the remainder nondefense business activities
and mortgage financing of home purchases.
By the end of August, however, the total
of such commitments had been reduced to
3.7 billion dollars, as shown by the chart. As
other commitments are worked off, more
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY COMMITMENTS
Billions of Dollars Billions o\ Doilc
APR. 30, 1951 AUG 31,1951
NOTE.—Outstanding commitments to acquire domestic loans
and investments. Data compiled by Life Insurance Association
of America from reports submitted by 45 life insurance com-
panies whose combined assets represent 85 per cent of all life
insurance company assets.
and more current financing will come un-
der the Program.
In encouraging lending officers of financ-
ing institutions and businessmen in general
to consider the role of credit in an inflation-
ary situation and in providing them with
standards by which to judge the relative
essentiality of proposed uses of credit, the
Program has perhaps achieved its greatest
success.
CONCLUSION
Voluntary credit restraint is an extremely
useful adjunct to general credit restraint
measures and should be further developed
for use whenever inflationary pressures
threaten depreciation of the dollar. If the
international situation does not worsen, there
may be a tendency for the sense of urgency
and the spirit of cooperation developed in
this period of national emergency to become
submerged in competitive self-interest as de-
fense production goals are approached. With
employment, personal income, and business
expenditures on plant and equipment at
record levels and defense expenditures in-
creasing rapidly, further test of all credit re-
straint measures may lie ahead.
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